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Intercepting Licensing Rights:
Why College Athletes Need a Federal
Right of Publicity
ABSTRACT

The right of publicity is the right of an individual to control the
commercial use of her name, image, likeness, or other identifiable
aspects of her persona. In the United States, the right of publicity is a
state-law right, not federal, and recognition of the right varies
significantly from state to state. The lack of uniformity among states
poses significant problems for individuals who are recognizable
throughout the United States. Specifically, student athletes, who
would lose the ability to play college athletics if they were reimbursed
for the use of their images, are among the individuals most at risk of
inequitable treatment resulting from varied state laws. This inequality
recently manifested itself when two former college quarterbacksalleged
that Electronic Arts, Inc.'s depiction of football players in its NCAA
Football game used their likenesses without compensation. One
quarterback brought his case in California, the other in New Jersey.
Despite the similarity of the facts, however, the district courts reached
This Note examines those two cases and
opposite conclusions.
create a federal right of publicity to better
Congress
recommends that
protect student athletes.
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College athletics has become a billion dollar business,' and so
too has the business of celebrity. 2 Therefore, one would think college
athletes are among the richest celebrities in the United States, but
that is not the case. The National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) forbids college athletes from receiving payment for their
participation in college sportS 3 and also prohibits college athletes from
endorsing any products. 4 Thus, the NCAA bans college athletes from
receiving compensation for their performance either on or off the field.

1.
See Joe Drape, Big Ten Network Alters Picture of College Sports, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/02/sports/02bigten.html (estimating the twenty-five year
agreement between the Big Ten and Fox Cable Networks at $2.8 billion); Stewart Mandel, De
Facto TV Network Will Push SEC Even Further Ahead of Competitors, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(July 24, 2009), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/stewart mandel/07/24/sec-espn/
index.html (discussing the SEC's $2.25 billion contract with ESPN over fifteen years and its
overlap with an $825 million CBS contract); NCAA Revenue Breakdown, NAT'L COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASS'N, http://ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/publicNCAA/Finances/Revenue (last updated
Jan. 17, 2012) (stating the NCAA made $845.9 million in fiscal year 2010-2011); Ralph D. Russo,
College Football Playoff: Questions and Answers on Game Location, Selection Committee,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 27, 2012, 4:26 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/27/collegefootball-playoff-faq-team-selection-bcs_n_1629880.html (estimating the television rights to the
future college football playoff system being worth, conservatively, at least $300-$500 million);
Richard Sandomir, Pac-10 Secures Rich Deals with Fox and ESPN, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/sports/04sandomir.html?1r=1&ref=sports
(confirming
a
$3 billion television deal between the Pacific-12 conference and both Fox and ESPN over a
twelve year period).
2.
See Dorothy Pomerantz, Lady Gaga Tops Celebrity 100 List, FORBES (May 18, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/2011/05/16/lady-gaga-tops-celebrity-100-11.html ("The men and women on
our annual Celebrity 100 list-the most powerful people in the entertainment business this
year-earned $4.5 billion over the last 12 months . . . .").
3.
See NCAA, 2011-12 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 12.1.2(a) (2011), available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D112.pdf (stating that student athletes
become ineligible to play if they use their athletic skills for pay in any form in that sport).
4.
See id. § 12.5.2.1(a) (stating that student athletes become ineligible to play if they
receive remuneration for or permit the use of their name or picture to "recommend or promote
directly the sale of or use of a commercial product or service of any kind").
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Seventeen athletes are named among the "Forbes 100 Most
Powerful Celebrities,"5 and they all have one thing in
common-endorsement deals.6 Tiger Woods, the third highest paid
athlete in the world,7 is an example of just how important it is to
leverage one's persona. Despite earning only $4.4 million on the golf
course from June 2011 through June 2012, Tiger Woods earned an
additional $55 million during that period through endorsements and
appearance fees. 8
The ability to leverage one's identity has increased in recent
years with the advent of social media networks. In fact, Forbes
Magazine considers presence on Facebook and Twitter in calculating a
celebrity's "fame."9 According to Forbes, the world's most powerful
celebrities rose to the top by garnering influence, and "[t]hese days
that means mastering social media."10 Except at a handful of colleges
and universities," college coaches permit athletes to use social
media.1 2 The right to profit from the use of one's identity is the basis
The World's Most Powerful Celebrities, FORBES (May 16, 2012), http://www.forbes.
5.
com/wealth/celebrities/list.
See, e.g., Kurt Badenhausen, Mayweather Tops List of the World's 100 Highest Paid
6.
Athletes, FORBES (June 16, 2012, 12:41 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sitesfkurtbadenhausen/2012/
06/18/mayweather-tops-list-of-the-worlds-100-highest-paid-athletes (noting that LeBron James,
like all NBA players, had his salary cut by 20 percent due to the NBA lockout, but continued to
make a significant amount of money from sponsors like Nike, Coca-Cola, State Farm, and
McDonalds).
7.
See Kurt Badenhausen, The World's Highest Paid Athletes, FORBES (June 16, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/athletes/list. The first- and second-highest-paid athletes in 2012 were
Floyd Mayweather and Manny Pacquiao, respectively. Id. This year was the first time in eleven
years that Tiger Woods was not number one on the list. See Badenhausen, supra note 6. These
two athletes were not used as examples because the pay structure for boxing differs significantly
from most other sports in that boxers do not receive a salary, rather they receive a "purse"
(percentage of the fight money) paid by the promoters. See Leonard Dozier, The Salary of a
Boxer, EHow, http://www.ehow.com/info_8519304_salary-boxer.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
See Badenhausen, supra note 6.
8.
Dorothy Pomerantz, J.Lo's Stunning Career Reincarnation Puts Her No. 1 On The
9.
Celebrity 100, FORBES (May 16, 2012, 9:56AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dorothypomerantz/
2012/05/16/jennifer-lopez-tops-celebrity- 100-list (listing other factors to consider like media
visibility in print, television, radio, and online).
10.
Pomerantz, supra note 2.
See Bradley Shear, NCAA Student-Athlete Social Media Bans May Be
11.
Unconstitutional, SHEAR ON SOC. MEDIA L. BLOG (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.shearsocialmedia.
men's
Villanova
(highlighting
com/2011/08/ncaa-student-athlete-social-media-bans.html
basketball, Mississippi State men's basketball, New Mexico men's basketball, Miami men's
football, South Carolina men's football, Iowa men's football, Boise State men's football, and
Kansas men's football as programs that have Twitter bans).
See Tom Satkowiak, 50 Twitter Tips for Division I Student-Athletes, CONSPICUOUS
12.
IDEAS BLOG (July 29, 2011, 2:27 PM), http://conspicuousideas.blogspot.com/2011/07/50-twittertips-for-division-i-student.html (detailing Twitter advice from Tom Satkowiak, the associate
director of media relations for the University of Tennessee men's basketball team); Twitter Tips
for Student Athletes!, UNIV. S. CAL. ATHLETICS (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.usctrojans.com/sports/
academics/spec-rel/110111aaa.html; see also Shear, supra note 11 ("[C]reating an outright ban on
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for the modern right of publicity, 13 and an identity is the only
money-making leverage student athletes have. Thus, the lack of
regulation in this field by the NCAA creates a safe harbor in which
student athletes can develop their personas or identities as brands. 14
The right of publicity is "a state-law created intellectual
property right whose infringement is a commercial tort of unfair
competition."1 5 Some states do not recognize the right of publicity. 16
In the states that do, courts enforce the right of publicity under state
common law,17 state statutes, or both.18 But the law setting out the
using Twitter andlor other social media platforms for a select group of students at a public
institution is a clear violation of the First Amendment . . . .").
13.
See, e.g., Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. Elec. Hendrix, L.L.C., No. C07-0338 (TSZ),
2008 WL 3243896, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 7, 2008) ("The inquiry under a right of publicity
action is whether there was a commercial appropriation of one's identity without consent.").
14.
See generally NCAA, supra note 3 (no mention of social networking).
15.

1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 1-2 (1999).

16.
Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, Wyoming. Cf. sources cited infra notes 17-18 (listing
states with "Right of Publicity").
17.
See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Allison v.
Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443 (11th Cir. 1998) ("We read Alabama's commercial
appropriation privacy right, however, to represent the same interests and address the same
harms as does the right of publicity as customarily defined."); Douglass v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying Illinois common law); Carson v. Here's Johnny
Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (applying Michigan common law); Apple
Corps. Ltd. v. Button Master, No. 96-CV-5470-A, 1998 WL 126935 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (recognizing
Pennsylvania common-law right of publicity); Hillerich & Bradsby Co. v. Christian Bros., 943 F.
Supp. 1136, 1141 (D. Minn. 1996) (granting preliminary injunction against infringement of
Minnesota right of publicity); Cheatham v. Paisano Publ'ns, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Ky.
1995) (recognizing both the "invasion of privacy" tort and the right of publicity); Estate of Presley
v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1355 (D.N.J. 1981) (finding that New Jersey supports a
common-law right of publicity); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (applying California common law), superseded by statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West
2012), as recognized in KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 717 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000); Genesis Publ'ns, Inc. v. Goss, 437 So. 2d 169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that
publishing pictures without permission is actionable as an invasion of privacy); Martin Luther
King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982)
(holding that Georgia recognizes the right of publicity); Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View
Estates, 441 P.2d 141, 144 (Haw. 1968) (holding that a right of privacy exists for appropriation of
photographs or names for commercial use); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1079 (Mo. Ct. App.
1911) ("[O]ne has an exclusive right to his picture . . . [as] a property right of material profit.");
Kimbrough v. Coca-Cola/USA, 521 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (recognizing the right of
privacy); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979) (applying Wisconsin
common law).
18.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 2012);
765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075/1 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-1 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 391.170 (West 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 3A (West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 20-202 (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.790 (West 2012); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§
50-51 (McKinney 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.01 (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1448 (West 2012); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8316 (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-28.1
(West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104 (West 2012); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.002 (West
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elements of publicity rights varies greatly from state to state. 19 The
lack of uniformity among states is particularly problematic for
athletes because, unlike other celebrities who tend to reside in New
York City, Los Angeles, and other major metropolitan hubs, athletes
reside in all fifty states because each state has at least one public
university and each university has an athletic program. 20 Moreover,
in the case of student athletes, a violation of student athletes' right of
publicity will often implicate numerous athletes who may reside in
different states. 2 1 The inconsistency across state laws inhibits class
certification because questions of law among different states vary. 22
As a result, the state-law status quo fails to address publicity-rights
issues that face many of today's student athletes.
Recently, the right of publicity has become the subject of an
increasing amount of litigation in the world of athletics. 23 With
fantasy sports becoming almost a $4 billion industry, 24 athletes are
starting to become protective of others who are profiting through the
use of their names. 25 In a case addressing this exact issue, the US

2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-3-2 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (West 2012); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 63.60.040 (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50 (West 2012).
Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-7 to -8 (West 2012) (offering protection for a
19.
person's "name; voice; signature; photograph; image; likeness; distinctive appearance; gesture; or
mannerisms" during a person's "lifetime or for one hundred (100) years after the person[]'s
death"), with VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (West 2012) (providing protection only for "name, portrait,
or picture" for up to "twenty years after the death" of the individual), and NEW YORK CIVIL
RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 2011) (offering no protection after the death of the individual).
20.
E.g., NCAA Sports Sponsorship: Football Bowl Subdivision, NCAA.ORG,
(last
http://webl.ncaa.org/onlineDir/exec2/sponsorship?sortOrder=4&division=1A&sport=MFB
visited Sept. 8, 2012) (listing forty-one states that have football programs in the Football Bowl
Subdivision). Even the University of Alaska Anchorage has a Division I men's hockey team. See
OFFICIAL HOME OF SEAWOLF ATHLETICS,

http://www.goseawolves.com/SportSelect.dbml

(last

visited Sept. 8, 2012).
21.
See, e.g., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., No. C 09-1967 CW,
2010 WL 5644656 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2010) (consolidating two class actions brought by student
athletes and former student athletes because of the similarity of the claims and legal theories).
22.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that
23.
a picture of Tiger Woods had been substantially transformed entitling it to First Amendment
protection overriding the athlete's right of publicity); Dryer v. NFL, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (D.
Minn. 2010) (alleging the NFL's use of game footage for promotional videos violated the players'
right of publicity); Lemon v. Harlem Globetrotters Int'l, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (D. Ariz. 2006)
(asserting that former Harlem Globetrotters' right of publicity was violated when their names,
likenesses, and numbers were used on a clothing line).
Tom Van Riper, The Biggest Sports Site You've Never Heard Of, FORBES.COM (Apr.
24.
16, 2009, 5:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/16/fantasy-sports-ventures-business-sportsfantasy-sports.html.
E.g., C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,
25.
505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the use of professional baseball players' names
and statistics for fantasy sports did not violate their right of publicity because it is protected by
the First Amendment).
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Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the use of athletes'
names and statistics is protected by the First Amendment. 26 The
former president of the NCAA, Myles Brand, criticized this ruling,
stating that the decision opened the door for not only the use of
professional athletes' names in fantasy sports, but also the use of
student athletes' names in fantasy sports.2 7 As a result of this ruling,
the gap between college athletics and professional sports continues to
decrease. The general public begins to see college athletes merely as
entertainers in a virtual fantasy world, much like they do now with
professional athletes. 28 Professional athletes are well compensated for
this dehumanization, but student athletes remain students first and
entertainers second. Brand argues that using the names of student
athletes in fantasy sports runs "counter to some of the most important
characteristics that distinguish college sports from professional
sports." 2 9

Namely, intercollegiate athletics have educational value,

whereas professional sports have primarily entertainment value.3 0
Thus, he argues, student athletes should be exempt from this ruling. 31
Fantasy sports are not the only market that has caught the
attention of athletes. Video games have also become a hotbed of
litigation for athletes. 32 Naturally, the right of publicity was not an
issue in the initial video-game litigation surrounding games such as
"Pong,"3 3 but as the technology and graphics improved, the individuals
displayed in the video games began to more accurately depict their
real-world counterparts, and video games and the right of publicity
became intertwined. 34 The cases of Keller v. ElectronicArts, Inc. and
26.
Id.
27.
Myles Brand, Fantasy Leagues May Be Less Than They Seem, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 8, 2008, 10:06 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/myles-brand/fantasy-leagues-may-bele-b_124758.html.
28.
Paul Kuharsky, Arian Foster and a Unicorn, ESPN.com (July 25, 2012, 12:05 PM),
http://espn.go.com/blog/afcsouth/post//id/38674/arian-foster-and-a-unicorn.
29.
Id.
Id.
30.
31.
See id.
32.
See, e.g., O'Bannon v. Nat'1 Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL
445190 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (alleging the NCAA rules constitute an antitrust violation
because the rules allow the NCAA to enter licensing agreements with video-game companies
fixing the price of his image at zero).
33.
Pong is a two-dimensional game that simulates table tennis. STEVEN L. KENT,
ULTIMATE HISTORY OF VIDEO GAMES: FROM PONG TO POKEMON-THE STORY BEHIND THE CRAZE
THAT TOUCHED OUR LIVES AND CHANGED THE WORLD, 34-35 (2001). There are no characters, it is

merely a dot and two lines. Id. It was one of the first arcade video games, and the first to reach
mainstream popularity. Id.
34.
See, e.g., No Doubt v. Activision Publ'g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (Cal. Ct. App.
2011) (alleging a violation of their right of publicity, members of the band "No Doubt" sued the
creators of the game Band Hero when they created avatars designed to look like the members of
the band). Claiming a violation of her right of publicity, a singer with the catch phrase "ooh la la"
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Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc. are two recent examples of the
intersection of video games, the right of publicity, and student
athletes. 35 In these cases, college football players in two states
brought class actions against the same video-game company,
Electronic Arts, Inc. (EA), based on the same facts. 36 They illustrate
the large role video games play in the right of publicity for any
contemporary athlete.
Part I of this Note chronicles the development of the right of
publicity and analyzes Keller and Hart. Part II analyzes how the
inconsistent state laws addressing the right of publicity negatively
impact athletes and complicate litigation, as exemplified by Keller and
Hart. Finally, Part III proposes that Congress create a federal
right-of-publicity statute to resolve the current problems caused by the
lack of uniformity among state laws.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Much of the inconsistency surrounding the right of publicity
arises from the confusion between whether the right is a personal
right to privacy or a property right. 37 In the United States, the right
of publicity originally developed from privacy law.38

A. From Privacy to Property
Scholars often attribute the origin of privacy law to a
law-review article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. 39 Warren
and Brandeis argued that people have the right to privacy, which they
defined as the right to prevent the disclosure of private facts that, if

sued a Japanese video-game company for making a game with a character named "Ulala" that
shared similarities with the singer. Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006).
35.
Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8,
2010), appeal pending (No. 10-15387); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757 (D.N.J. 2011).
Keller, 2010 WL 530108, at *1; Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 760.
36.
37.
See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 836 n.14 (1979) (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting that confusion is not surprising "when the right of publicity is discussed as a
variety of the right of privacy, a personal right, and then promptly described as a property
right"); see also COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION-INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY-PRIVACY 173 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2004) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN

RIGHTS] ("[Tihere is an important distinction that is often disregarded in connection with the
concept of appropriation of personality . . . . [The distinction is] between a right against harm to
the claimant, and a right of ownership.").
38.
See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at ch. 1.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193
39.
(1890).
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exposed, would "embitter" one's life. 40 Privacy law is different from
property law because the "possibility of future profits is not a right of
property which the law ordinarily recognizes."4 1 Professor William
Prosser later expanded on this notion by describing privacy law as
providing four distinct torts: (1) intrusion, (2) disclosure, (3) false
light, and (4) appropriation. 42 The Restatement (Second) of Torts later
adopted this four-part division, and almost every court in the United
States has followed suit.4 3 Courts often define the fourth tort as
"[a]ppropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs name
or likeness," 44 which in effect describes the right of publicity.
It quickly became clear to both scholars and practitioners that
the right to protect against misappropriation of a well-known
celebrity's name or likeness could not be fully protected under a law
focused on injury to the celebrity's feelings. 45 The tendency to view
the right of privacy as a purely personal right posed several hurdles to
the creation of the right of publicity. 46 The two most evident problems
were the unwillingness of the courts to protect celebrities from
unpermitted commercial use of their identities (on the grounds they
were public figures who had made a career of being in the public) and
that the personal right of privacy was created as a remedy for mental
injury, not commercial injury. 47
In a shift from personal rights to property rights, Judge Jerome
Frank first coined the term "right of publicity" in his opinion, Haelan
Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.48 The plaintiff in that case,
Haelan Laboratories, obtained from professional baseball players the
exclusive right to use their names and pictures on baseball cards. 49
The defendant and competitor, Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., also used
the names and pictures of professional baseball players, but without

40.
41.
42.

See id. at 204.
Id. at 204-05.
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 388-89 (1960) [hereinafter

Privacy]; see also WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, ch. 20

(5th ed. 1984).
See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at 1-18 to 1-19.
43.
44.
See Privacy, supra note 42, at 389.
45.
See O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941) (reasoning that a
football player was not a private person and even though he did not wish to be associated with
Pabst's beer advertisement, he would not be disgraced by association with a "legitimate and
eminently respectable business").
46.

JULIUS C.S. PINCKAERS, FROM PRIVACY TOWARD A NEW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

RIGHT IN PERSONA 24 (Egbert J. Dommering & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., Info. Law Series, Ser.
No. 5, 1996).
47.
Id. at 25-26.
48.
202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
49.
Id. at 867.
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the players' authorization.50 Topps argued that only the baseball
players could bring an action against it because the invasion of the
right to privacy is a personal right, and therefore is not assignable.61
In holding that "[i]t is no defense that ... defendant is the assignee of
a subsequent contract," Judge Frank reasoned, "a man has a right in
the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the
exclusive privilege of publishing his picture."5 2 This marked the
creation of a new property right in the commercial value of a person's
identity.
After Haelan, the notion that the right of publicity is a property
right began to take hold in several jurisdictionS 53 and was validated by
the Supreme Court in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
54
In
the Court's first and only case involving the right of publicity.
and
filming
for
station
a
television
sued
Zacchini
Zacchini, Hugo
showing his "human cannonball" routine in its entirety during a
nightly news broadcast. 5 The Court ruled that, under the state-law
right-of-publicity claim, the First Amendment does not immunize the
television station for airing the entire performance without Zacchini's
consent. 56 The Court's recognition of the right of publicity confirmed
the validity of the right and was the impetus that caused several
states to recognize the right.
The transformation in right-of-publicity law from a privacy
right to a property right is best exemplified in the two distinct claims
for misappropriation. A privacy misappropriation claim recognizes a
person has the right to protect against the use of her image for
commercial purposes on the grounds that association with the product
or activity harms an interest that should be protected, such as an
interest in reputation or dignity.57 Such a claim would not protect
against an unauthorized use, such as using a player's likeness on a
baseball card as in Haelan, that does not do any direct reputational
harm to the person. On the other hand, a property misappropriation
of personality or persona claim identifies that a person owns her
Id. at 868.
50.
Id. at 867.
51.
Id. at 868-69.
52.
See, e.g., Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 1969) ("Plaintiff has a
53.
valuable property right in his name, photograph and image and that he may sell these property
rights."); Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 235 A.2d 62, 76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967) ("[linsofar
as plaintiffs' claim is based on the appropriation of their likeness and name for defendant's
commercial benefit, it is an action for invasion of their 'property' rights and not one for 'injury to
the person."').
54.
433 U.S. 562 (1977).
Id. at 564.
55.
Id. at 575.
56.
See COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 37, at 173.
57.
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image and is therefore entitled to its commercial value.5 8 Under such
a claim, all unauthorized commercial uses would be actionable, not
merely those that cause reputational harm. Courts in the United
States have long recognized property as a judicially enforceable right
between people about things both tangible and intangible, and those
rights are seen as granting the possessor of the thing a bundle of
rights including the ability to transfer, use, possess, and exclude
others from that thing.5 9 Under this conception, the right of publicity
can be viewed as a property right protecting a persona and
authorizing transfer, use, possession, and exclusion of others from the
persona through the grant of exclusive licenses. 60 It is through this
perception of the right of publicity that the right was able to survive
the transformation from a privacy right to a form of property right.
B. From Property to Intellectual Property
Courts often analogize the right of publicity to intellectual
property rights.6 1 One explanation of why courts make this connection
is that both the right of publicity and intellectual property rights are
intangible. 62 They are both distinguishable from tangible property
because they are neither excludable (able to be stored away from
others) nor capable of rivalrous consumption (able to be consumed or
used by someone such that others cannot then use the item). 63 A
closer look at the policy rationales behind both the right of publicity
and other intellectual property rights further explains and justifies
this association.
The policy underlying the right of publicity that most closely
resembles an intellectual property right is "incentive justification." 64
The incentive justification theory asserts that certain persons "should
be given an economic incentive to undertake socially useful or

58.
Id.
59.
See, e.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (8 Wheat.) (1823) (finding that the King
of England had superior title over the Native Americans because the Native Americans did not
have the right to transfer or exclude others from the land).
60.
See PINCKAERS, supra note 466, at 277.
61.
See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co, 433 U.S.562 at 573
(analogizing the "right of publicity" to copyright and patent law); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25
Cal. 3d 813, 834-35 (1979) (explaining that considerable time, money, and energy are spent
developing one's prominence in a particular field and the result of this hard work is recognition
and good will from consumers similar to a trademark).
62.
See PINCKAERS, supra note 46, at 278.
LYDIA PALLAS LOREN & JOSEPH SCOTT MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
63.
CASES AND MATERIALS 1-2 (2012).

64.

See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 15, at 2-10.
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enriching activities and thereby enter the public eye."6 5

95
Indeed, the

Supreme Court recognized this rationale when it noted that protecting
the right of publicity "rests on more than a desire to compensate the
performer for the time and effort invested in his act; the protection
provides an economic incentive for [the performer] to make the
investment required to produce a performance of interest to the
public." 66 This policy consideration resembles the policy behind patent

and copyright law that "[c]reators need a certain amount of
remuneration in order to invest their time and labor into creative
pursuits instead of other activities that might result in higher
rewards." 67 Accordingly, the right of publicity shares a fundamental
policy rationale with both copyrights and patents.
In addition to reflecting the policies behind copyright and
patent laws, the rationales for the right of publicity closely mirror
those supporting trademarks. First, the incentive justification from a
trademark perspective is not to incentivize invention or creative
pursuits, but rather to incentivize companies to invest in the goodwill
associated with a mark.6 8 Similarly, one's persona can be viewed as a
form of goodwill, especially when it is used commercially for
endorsements. In the same way that a company would be unwilling to
invest in creating a quality product if its competitors could simply use
its trademark, individuals would be less likely to invest time and
energy in "creative pursuits" if others could unilaterally profit from
their public persona by using it to endorse their products. Second, one
of the primary goals of trademark law is to prevent consumer
confusion.69 In a similar fashion, the right of publicity protects
against consumer confusion by guarding against misappropriation of
one's persona to endorse a product, or in the case of EA, to help sell a
product through association.7 0 Thus, the rationale for recognizing the
right of publicity also closely resembles the rationale for granting
trademark protection.
Despite these similarities, intellectual property rights, such as
the ones conferred by patents, copyrights, and trademarks, differ from
the right of publicity because they are all protected by federal

Id.
65.
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576-77.
66.
LOREN & MILLER, supra note 63, at 1.
67.
68.
Id. at 544-45.
Id.
69.
See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
70.
that an advertisement depicting a robot dressed like Vanna White was a violation of White's
right of publicity).
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statutes. 71 The right of publicity, on the other hand, remains a
piecemeal compilation of state statutes and common law or is wholly
unrecognized.
C. NCAA Student-Athlete Likeness-Licensing Litigation
Two recent cases provide paradigmatic examples of how
divergent state-law causes of action can negatively affect student
athletes: Keller v. ElectronicArts, Inc. and Hart v. ElectronicArts, Inc.
In both cases, former college football players sued the same
video-game company alleging nearly identical facts. 72 These cases
demonstrate how differences in the right-of-publicity laws as well as
differences in the way courts apply the laws render the protection
afforded student athletes inadequate. 73
1. Keller v. ElectronicArts, Inc.
In 2010, Samuel Keller, a former college football player at both
Arizona State University and the University of Nebraska, sued EA,
the NCAA, and the Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC) in the US
District Court for the Northern District of California. 74 When Keller
graduated from high school, he was considered the ninth-best
quarterback in the country.7 5 After playing three years at Arizona
State, Keller transferred to Nebraska where he set the school's
single-season record for completion percentage (69.1 percent). 7 6 Keller
briefly signed with the Oakland Raiders of the National Football
League (NFL) as a free agent,7 7 but the Raiders released him less than
a month later.7 8
Keller alleged that the NCAA violated his right of publicity
under Indiana law (the NCAA is headquartered in Indianapolis,
Indiana) and that EA violated his right of publicity under California
71.
35 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (providing patent protection); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (providing
copyright protection); 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2006) (providing trademark protection).
72.
See discussion infra Part I.C.
73.
See discussion infra Part I.C.
74.
Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 8, 2010), appealpending (No. 10-15387).
75.
Player Bio: Sam Keller, ARIZ. STATE UNIV. SUN DEVIL ATHLETICS, http://www.the
sundevils.com/sports/m-footbl/mtt/keller-sam00.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2012).
76.
Player Bio: Sam Keller, UNIv. OF NEB. FOOTBALL, http://www.huskers.com/
ViewArticle.dbml?SPSID=4&SPID=22&DBOEMID=100&ATCLID=866801&(LSEASON=2007
(last visited Sept. 7, 2012).
77.
Matt Loede, Raiders Sign QB Keller; Waive Meyer, RAIDERS GAB BLOG (June 25,
2008), http://www.raidersgab.com/2008/06/25/raiders-sign-qb-keller-waive-meyer.
78.
Transactions: 2008-2009, NFLHUSKERS.COM, http://nflhuskers.com/transactions
0809.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2012).
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The
law (EA is headquartered in Redwood City, California).79
allegation is based on EA's video-game series titled NCAA Football,
where consumers simulate football games between more than 120
Keller claimed EA designed the virtual football
NCAA teams.8
players in the likeness of the real-life football players on their
respective teams to make the game more realistic."' He asserted that
the players created by EA share all of the following attributes as their
real-life counterparts: the same jersey numbers, the same home
states, the same physical characteristics (including height and
weight), and they play the same positions.

82

Thus, he claimed the

NCAA "used" his likeness when it "expressly reviewed and knowingly
approved each version of each NCAA-brand videogame."8 3 At the time
of this Note's publication, Keller intended to certify his case as a class
action.84
The NCAA argued Keller's right-of-publicity claim should fail
as a matter of law because the NCAA did not "use" his image or
The district court agreed and dismissed Keller's
likeness. 8 5
right-of-publicity claim against the NCAA for failure to offer any
authority showing that approval could be construed as "use" under
Indiana's right-of-publicity statute. 6 But the court granted Keller
leave to amend his complaint.8 7
EA did not deny it used the likeness of college football players
in its game.8 8 Instead, EA asserted its use of college football players
qualifies as fair use, thus barring Keller's right-of-publicity claims. 89
The fair use doctrine set forth in the 1976 Copyright Act lists four
factors used to determine whether a use qualifies as fair use:
(1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and

Keller, 2010 WL 530108, at *1-2.
79.
Id. at *1.
80.
Id.
81.
Id. Keller also alleged EA sent questionnaires to the team's equipment managers in
82.
order to create players with the same equipment, such as facemasks, gloves, or sweatbands. Id.
83.
Id. at *2.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
86.
Id.
87.
Id. at *3.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
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(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 9 0

The first factor asks whether and to what extent the new work
is "transformative."1 To qualify as transformative, the work must
add "something new, with a further purpose or different character,
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message." 92 The
more transformative the use, the less significance courts give to the
other three factors. 93 EA asserted its use of college athletes' likenesses
is sufficiently transformative to qualify for fair use protection.9 4
The court disagreed, stating that, as a matter of law at the
motion-to-dismiss stage, EA's depiction of Keller was not sufficiently
transformative. 9 5 The court contrasted the depiction of Keller with
another California video-game case, Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc.,
where the court held that a specific use was transformative. 96 The
court found the cases were distinguishable because, among other
things, "the game's setting is identical to where the public found
[Keller] during his collegiate career: on the football field." 9 7 Therefore,
the court denied EA's motion to dismiss.98 As a result, the Ninth
Circuit has heard Keller's case, 99 and the forthcoming opinion may
change the landscape of the right of publicity.
2. Hart v. ElectronicArts, Inc.
Alleging similar facts to Keller, Ryan Hart, a former Rutgers
University quarterback, brought a putative class action suit against
EA in the US District Court for the District of New Jersey for violation
of his right of publicity under New Jersey law. 100 In this case, EA
again conceded that a sufficient prima facie right of publicity claim
had been asserted under New Jersey law and again invoked the First
Amendment as a defense.10 1
The court weighed EA's First Amendment rights against Hart's
right of publicity using what it described as the "two key tests followed
by courts today": (1) the transformative-use test (borrowed from the

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
Id.
Id.
Keller, 2010 WL 530108, at *5.
Id.
Id. at *4-5 (citing Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (2006)).
Id. at *5.
Id. at *11.
Id., argued, No. 10-15387 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 2011).
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760, 762 (D.N.J. 2011).
Id. at 764, 766.
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copyright fair use doctrine) and (2) the Rogers test (borrowed from
trademark actions brought pursuant to the Lanham Act). 102
Unlike the court in Keller, the New Jersey district court held
that EA's use of Hart's likeness in its video game was
transformative. 103 In reaching its conclusion, the court emphasized
that EA created a mechanism that allowed users to alter the
appearance of the virtual players. 10 4 Thus, EA's use of the players'
likenesses constituted a transformative fair use.10 5 Furthermore, the
court, though unconvinced that either form of the Rogers test would be
applicable to a misappropriation case,106 found that EA's use of Hart's
likeness did not violate either of the Rogers tests.10 7
Courts most often apply the Rogers test in trademark cases;10 8
it is named for the famous film couple Fred Astaire and Ginger
Rogers. 109 In 1989, Rogers brought a false-endorsement claim against
the creators of the film Ginger and Fred about two fictional Italian
cabaret performers who had traveled around Italy imitating Rogers
and Astaire.n 0 The Rogers test is in fact two different tests: the
Rogers Lanham Act test and the Rogers right-of-publicity test.1 1' The
Rogers Lanham Act test asks: (1) whether the challenged work has
relevance to the underlying work; and, if so, (2) whether the title
misleads the public as to the source of the content of the work.1 12 The
Rogers right-of-publicity test asks: (1) whether the challenged work is
wholly unrelated to the underlying work; or (2) whether the use of the
plaintiffs name is a disguised commercial advertisement.1 13 The court
in Hart found EA's use of Hart's likeness passed both tests because
even though the game may draw upon the public's familiarity with
Hart, it does not "explicitly state that [Hart] endorses or contributes to
the creation of the game," and it does not confuse potential consumers
as to the source, or creator, of the game.11 4 Ultimately, the court held

.

Id. at 776-93.
102.
Id. at 787.
103.
Id. at 785.
104.
Id. at 794.
105.
Id. at 792-93 ("The transformative test better balances First Amendment and right
106.
of publicity interests . .
Id. at 794.
107.
Id. at 776.
108.
See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying the Rogers test for the
109.
first time to a claim by Ginger Rogers alleging violation of the Lanham Act and infringement of
her rights to publicity and privacy).
110.
Id. at 996-97.
111.
Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 792.
Id. at 793.
112.
Id.
113.
114.
Id.
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that, even though EA passed both tests, the court need not explicitly
adopt either test because EA's First Amendment defense prevailed. 115
Therefore, the court granted EA's motion for summary judgment, and
Hart lost his right-of-publicity case.1 16
II. ANALYZING THE PROBLEM FACING STUDENT ATHLETES

Under the current legal regime, many individuals, especially
student athletes, have no legal recourse when their rights of publicity
are violated. Currently, only twenty-nine states recognize the right of
publicity.11 7 Of those twenty-nine states, the law of each individual
state differs in cause of action,118 scope of protection,1 19 duration of
protection, 120 statute of limitations, 121 and remedy. 122 These variations
affect whether a plaintiff wins, loses, or is able to bring a case at all.
For instance, Samuel Keller could not have brought a claim for a
violation of his right of publicity in the following states that recognize
the right: Massachusetts, 1 2 3 Nebraska, 124 New York, 125 Ohio, 126

115.
Id. at 794.
116.
Id.
117.
See supra note 16.
118.
Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.03 (West 2012) (creating a cause of action
only for individuals domiciled in the state), with IND. CODE § 32-36-1-1 (West 2012) (creating a
cause of action for acts or events that take place in the state), and R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-28.1
(West 2012) (creating a cause of action for any person within the jurisdiction of the state).
119.
Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-1 (West 2012) (offering protection for "name,
voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, distinctive appearance, gesture, or mannerisms"),
with VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (West 2012) (providing protection only for "name, portrait, or
picture"), and NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-208 (West 2012) (providing protection after death for only
"name" and "likeness").
120.
Compare OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1448 (West 2012) (providing protection for up to
one hundred years after the death of the individual), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104 (West
2012) (protecting an individual's name, photograph, or likeness for ten years after the
individual's death), and UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-3-2 (West 2012) (providing no protection after the
death of the individual).
121.
Compare NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-211 (West 2012) (providing one year to bring an
action), with NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.800 (West 2012) (providing that a successor in interest
has six months after becoming aware of a violation to file a claim).
122.
Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 3A (West 2012) (authorizing treble
damages in the court's discretion), with CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2012) (authorizing
attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party).
123.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 3A (West 2012) (applying only to "name,
portrait or picture").
124.
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-211 (West 2012). Keller did not bring his action within the
one-year statute of limitations.
125.
See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 2011) (recognizing only uses of
"name, portrait or picture").
126.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.03 (West 2012). Keller was not domiciled in Ohio.
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Pennsylvania, 12 7 Texas, 128 Utah, 12 9 Virginia,13 0 or Wisconsin.1 3 1 These
inconsistencies illustrate the need for a federal right of publicity.
A. Specific ProblemsPosed By the Restatement for Student Athletes
Even if a student athlete resides in a state that recognizes the
right of publicity, some student athletes may not be able to establish a
prima facie case for violation of the right of publicity if the state has
adopted the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.132 Under the
Restatement, to establish a claim for a publicity violation, a student
athlete must satisfy the following elements: (1) the defendant used the
plaintiffs identity; (2) the identity has commercial value; (3) the
commercial value is appropriated for the purpose of trade; (4) the
plaintiff did not consent; and (5) the appropriation resulted in a
commercial injury. 133 While the first, third, and fourth elements are
relatively easy to satisfy, student athletes will likely struggle to
establish the second and fifth elements, which will prevent them from
succeeding on the claim.
The second element of the claim requires that the plaintiffs
identity be commercially valuable. 134 Some cases interpret this to
mean that the plaintiff must be famous. 135 For example, in Pesina v.
Midway Manufacturing Co., 13 6 a martial artist who was a model for
characters in the arcade version of the video game Mortal Kombat
sued the video-game company for violating his right of publicity when
the company adapted the game to a home version. 137 The US District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois held the martial artist failed
to show his likeness was recognizable and therefore failed to show a
See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8316 (West 2012). Keller was not domiciled in
127.
Pennsylvania.
See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.002 (West 2012) (recognizing the right of publicity
128.
only in the deceased).
129.
See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-2 to -3 (West 2012) (applying only to "name, title,
picture, or portrait" and only if used in an advertisement that implies endorsement).
See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (West 2012) (applying only to "name, portrait, or
130.
picture").
See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 995.50 (West 2012) (recognizing only "name, portrait, or
131.
picture").

See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8316 (West 2012) (providing relief only for
132.
people whose identity has commercial value and have suffered a commercial injury).
133.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 46

(1995).

Id.
134.
See id. cmt. D ("[A] few cases appear to require some minimum degree of fame or
135.
notoriety as a prerequisite for relief. However, the identity of even an unknown person may
possess commercial value.").
948 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
136.
Id. at 41.
137.
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violation of his right of publicity. 138 Like the martial artist in Pesina,
many student athletes are not recognizable to members of the public,
which devalues their likeness. Consequently, many student athletes
will find it difficult to satisfy this element of the claim, making it
almost impossible to ever successfully assert a right-of-publicity claim.
Student athletes may also have trouble proving the fifth
element-the appropriation of their likeness resulted in commercial
injury. 139 The Restatement defines commercial injury as "loss to the
plaintiff' or "unjust gain to the defendant." 140 This is problematic for
student athletes because, unlike professional athletes, student
athletes are not allowed to profit while in school. Therefore they
suffer no loss; their monetary damages are zero. 141 And although
there may be a way to quantify the defendant's unjust gain, doing so
can be difficult. For instance, in a video game that features over 120
NCAA teams, each with eighty-five athletes on a team, it would be
difficult-absent a class action-to prove the defendant's unjust gain
from one specific student athlete. Therefore, even if the athlete
resides in a state that recognizes publicity rights, a student athlete
will have difficulty establishing all elements of the claim. But even in
states that decline to adopt the Restatement the statutory protection
afforded student athletes for violation of their publicity rights is
inadequate, as demonstrated by Keller and Hart.
B. Keller & Hart
Keller and Hart involve similar facts, the same legal theories,
and the same defendants, but, at the motion-to-dismiss phase in Keller
and at the summary judgment phase in Hart, the court in each case
reached different results. 142 Admittedly, a number of factors may
have affected the outcome of either trial; 143 however, an obvious
difference between the two cases is venue. As it turns out, the choice
of venue has a material effect on the court's determination.
In contrast to Hart's case, which he brought under New
Jersey's right-of-publicity law that developed from common law, 144

138.

Id. at 42.

139.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

140.
141.
142.
Inc., No. C
10-15387).
143.
144.

§ 46

(1995).

See id. cmt. A.
See NCAA, supra note 3, at 12.5.
See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757 (D.N.J. 2011); Keller v. Elec. Arts,
09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010), appeal pending (No.
For instance: the relative skill of counsel or the judges who heard the cases.
Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1355 (D.N.J. 1981).
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Keller brought his case under California law, which is statutory. 145
California is also home to the majority of the United States' celebrities
and is the state where the majority of the country's right-of-publicity
lawsuits originate. As a result, a series of decisions by the US Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has expanded the scope of California's
right-of-publicity law. For example, in 1974, the Ninth Circuit found
that the unauthorized use of a race-car driver's automobile in an
advertisement was a violation of the driver's right of publicity. 146 The
court reasoned that the driver's own likeness could be identified by his
car's "uniquely distinguishing features." 147 Similarly, in 1992, the
court held that the creators of a television advertisement violated
Vanna White's right of publicity where the advertisement depicted a
robot with a blonde wig turning letters on a set resembling White's
television show Wheel of Fortune.148 Therefore, had Hart filed his
claim in California, he likely would have achieved a dramatically
different result.
Looking at what would have occurred had Hart filed his claim
in Missouri demonstrates another example of the inconsistency in
state law. Missouri rejects the "transformative use" test as a defense
to a right-of-publicity claim and instead uses a "predominant use"
test.14 9 Under the predominant use test:
If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the commercial value of an
individual's identity, that product should be held to violate the right of publicity and not
be protected by the First Amendment, even if there is some "expressive" content in it
15 0
that might qualify as "speech" in other circumstances.

The predominant use test provides less protection for EA's
NCAA Football, making a First Amendment defense unlikely to
succeed. The variance of First Amendment protection among state
laws creates inconsistent and unjust treatment of athletes with the
same claims.
Although oral argument was originally heard in the Keller case
in February 2011, and a rehearing was held on July 13, 2012, at the
time this Note was published the Ninth Circuit had yet to issue its

CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2012).
145.
See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825-27 (9th Cir.
146.
1974).
Id. at 827.
147.
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
148.
Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003).
149.
Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of
150.
Publicity-FreeSpeech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 500 (2003).
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opinion.1 5 Two cases will likely influence the opinion. The first is the
recent Supreme Court case Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Ass'n.1 52 In Brown, the Supreme Court held that a California law
prohibiting the sale or rental of violent video games to minors is
unconstitutional.1 5 3
While not directly addressing the right of
publicity in video games, the Supreme Court's decision affirmed the
extensive First Amendment protections video games enjoy and may
add weight to EA's First Amendment defense.
The second case is Brown v. ElectronicArts, Inc. in which Jim
Brown, a former NFL player, 15 4 sued EA for violating his right of
publicity in its game Madden NFL.15 5 In a case factually similar to
Keller and Hart, the US District Court for the Central District of
California denied Brown's Lanham Act claim, stating that consumers
would not be misled to believe that Brown was endorsing the product
as a result of recognizing his likeness.15 6 After denying Brown's
Lanham Act claim, the court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the right-of-publicity claim, which, at the time of this
Note, is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.1 57 Although the
district court did not reach the merits of Brown's right-of-publicity
claim, the court's discussion of the game's "numerous creative
elements," "manipula[tion] of virtual athletes," and analogy to an
"expressive painting" tend to lend support to EA's transformative-use
defense. 15 8
Although these two cases may favor a finding of transformative
use, which would support EA's fair use defense, other California
precedent may weigh in Keller's favor. For example, if a race-car
driver could be identified by the unique features of his race car, 15 9 a
strong case can be made that a football player could be identified by
the colors, logos, and numbers on his jersey. Moreover, the college
football players in NCAA Football also play the same position, are
similar height and weight, and have the same skin tone as their real

151.

Watch Recording for Case: Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 10-15387, UNITED

STATES COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT (July 13, 2012), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media

viewvideo subpage.php?pk-vid=0000006196.
152.
131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
153.
Id. at 2742.
154.
For further discussion of the interplay between retired NFL players and EA, see
infra notes 213-17.
155.
Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 2:09CV01598(FMC-RZx), 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 131387
(C.D. Cal. 2009), appealpending sub nom. Keller v. Elect. Arts, Inc., (No. 09-56675) (9th Cir.).
156.
See id. at *13.
157.
Id. at *15.
158.
See id. at *11.
159.
See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825-27 (9th Cir.
1974).
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world counterparts. 1 60 Other damaging evidence weighing in favor of
finding a violation of the right of publicity is that the announcers in
the video game pre-record the names of all of the student athletes
even though they "know (they are] not supposed to." 16 1 Moreover, the
announcers record uncommon last names so that when a consumer
modifies a unique player name, like "Hansbrough," or "Mbah a
Moute," the announcers will accurately announce those names. 162
Therefore, even though the names of the players are not displayed,
there is strong evidence that EA's use of student-athlete likenesses is
intentional. Furthermore, unsealed emails and depositions revealed
that university officials were aware that EA was using student-athlete
likenesses.1 6 3 In 2009, Nebraska Chancellor Harvey Perlman sent an
email to the Big Ten Commissioner Dan Beebe in which he wrote, "I'm
still trying to figure out by what authority the NCAA licenses these
[name and likeness] rights to the game makers."1 64 While intent is not
an element in every state, some states acknowledge the "intent to
obtain a commercial advantage" as an element of the right of
publicity.1 65
C. ProfessionalAthletes Compared to Student Athletes
Professional athletes are able to license their likenesses to
video-game companies and profit from the use of their likenesses. 166
Student athletes, however, are not so fortunate. For example, if a
high school athlete wants to play a sport in college, she must sign a
contract granting the rights to use her name or picture to the NCAA,
to the university she attends, and to the conference to which the
8
university belongs.1 67 She technically retains her right of publicity,16
but she cannot profit from that right while in school without forfeiting
her "amateur" status and being banned from participating in NCAA
Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
160.
8, 2010), appealpending (No. 10-15387).
Anastasios Kaburakis et al., NCAA Student-Athletes' Rights of Publicity, EA Sports,
161.
and the Video Game Industry, 27 ENT. & SPORTs L. 1 (2009).
Id.
162.
Jon Solomon, EA Sports and Collegiate Licensing Co. Used Real NCAA Players in
163.
Video Games, E-Mails Suggest, AL.COM (Sept. 18, 2012, 8:40 PM), http://www.al.com/sports/
index. ssf/2012/09/eassports-and-collegiatelicen.html#incart-river.
Id.
164.
Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 369 (Mo. 2003) (listing intent to gain a
165.
commercial advantage as an element of the Missouri right-of-publicity statute).
See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757 (D.N.J. 2011).
166.
See NCAA, supra note 3, at 12.5; see also Form 10-3a: Student-Athlete
167.
Statement-NCAA Division I, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/money-andmarch-madness/etc/student-athlete-statement.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2012).
Brand, supra note 27.
168.

106

VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 15:1:85

athletics.1 69 Furthermore, the NCAA and CLC have capitalized on the
student athlete's plight. They have created licensing agreements with
video-game companies like EA.1 7 0 These agreements have generated
over a half-billion dollars for the NCAA and EA through games like
NCAA Football and NCAA Basketball, but the players (who
supposedly retain their rights of publicity) have not received any
compensation.' 7 ' Consequently, among athletes, student athletes are
uniquely disadvantaged by the use of their names and likenesses
because they are unable to receive compensation for such uses.
The distinction between professional athletes and student
athletes does not exist among other celebrities for whom the right of
publicity is an important remedy. Student athletes must maintain
"amateur" status according to the NCAA in order to be eligible to
compete.1 72 As the right of publicity has evolved from a protection of
privacy to a protection of commercial interests, it has always evolved
with celebrities in mind.1 73 The demands on the lives of professional
athletes are different than the demands on the lives of traditional
celebrities. For example, athletes not only live in every state,1 74 but
athletes must travel throughout the United States on a weekly basis
during their respective seasons. As a result, the inconsistency in state
law affects athletes to a greater degree than traditional celebrities and
the implications of a federal right of publicity are favorable for an
athlete's lifestyle. Of all contemporary "celebrities," student athletes
stand to gain the most from a federal right of publicity because they
have the same concerns as professional athletes, but they are not
afforded the same rights. The ability to demand high-paying future
salaries by leveraging their personas is student athletes' only hope to
capitalize on the celebrity they develop as student athletes. Moreover,
not all college athletes become professional athletes, and many
athletes' careers are cut short by injury, so the inability to monetize
their personas while students may prevent them from capitalizing on
their one opportunity to do so.

169.
See NCAA MANUAL I, supra note 3, at 12.1.2.
170.
Mark Fainaru-Wada, NCAA Basketball Game in Jeopardy, ESPN.COM (Feb. 10,
2010, 11:15 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/storyid=4904393.
Id.
171.
172.
See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3 at 12.5.
173.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

identity with commercial value an element of the right of publicity).
174.
See supra note 20.
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III. SOLUTION: A FEDERAL RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The proposed solution consists of two parts. First, to provide
more predictability and consistency in the field of publicity rights,
especially for student athletes, Congress should pass a federal
right-of-publicity statute. Second, to further protect the interests of
student athletes, this Note proposes the NCAA create an escrow fund
for licensing fees that the NCAA collects through licensing student
athletes' names, likenesses, or personas. The NCAA would make the
fund available to student athletes upon completion of their eligibility
or upon graduation.17 5

A. A FederalRight of Publicity
While federal trademark law is similar to the right of publicity,
the two are not equivalent; federal trademark law does not fill the void
of the right of publicity in states that do not recognize the right. The
right of publicity can be viewed as a form of intellectual property, and
infringement of one's right of publicity can be viewed as a form of
unfair competition.17 6 As Professor McCarthy explains, "Lanham Act
§ 43(a) cannot provide a federal vehicle for the assertion of
infringement of the state law right of publicity for the simple reason
that § 43(a) is limited to some form of falsity, while infringement of
Because
the right of publicity involves no element of falsity."17 7
even
the
and
student athletes reside throughout the United States,
states recognizing the right of publicity interpret the right
inconsistently, 7 8 Congress needs to pass a right-of-publicity statute
providing a comprehensive cause of action for all US citizens. Such a
statute would avoid the patent unfairness that arises when courts
79
treat plaintiffs differently despite similar facts.1
The issues that differ the most among state laws, and that
Congress therefore needs to specifically address when drafting a
federal right-of-publicity statute, are: (1) Who should have a federal
right of publicity? (2) What should a federal right-of-publicity protect?
(3) Should there be a postmortem federal right of publicity? And (4)
how long should a federal right-of-publicity protection last?

175.
Perhaps the fund could only be accessed by student athletes who graduate in order
to incentivize obtaining a degree, but the implications of such a proposal are beyond the scope of
this Note.
176.
See supra text accompanying note 15.
177.

1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 1202 (2d ed.

2009-2011).
See supra Part I.
178.
179.
See supra Part I.C.
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1. Who Should Have a Federal Right of Publicity?
A minority of states have taken the position that the right of
publicity requires the plaintiff to have acquired a certain degree of
"celebrity" in order to state a claim for infringement of his or her right
of publicity.1 80 Congress should reject this position in the federal
right-of-publicity statute.
The status of celebrity is relative; it
depends on factors such as time, territory, and genre. For example,
millions of teenage girls around the world may consider Justin Bieber
a "celebrity," while certain age groups would likely fail to recognize
him. Because the nature of celebrity is relative, fame should not be
part of the legal analysis or a basis for a cause of action in publicity
rights.
Instead, as a majority of states recognize, 181 everyone should
have a right of publicity, without any condition precedent to
acquisition of the right. The Ninth Circuit recognized this logic when
it explained that the right of publicity protects not only a celebrity's
identity, but also her nonfamous birth name. 182 If the defendant
thought the plaintiffs identity had commercial value and used the
plaintiffs identity for commercial purposes, then a per se recognition
of the value in the plaintiffs identity has been established. Therefore,
fame should not be a prerequisite of the claim; all persons should be
able to recover for a right-of-publicity violation.
2. What Should a Federal Right of Publicity Protect?
State laws vary with respect to the scope of protection the right
of publicity provides. 183 In some states, the right of publicity protects
only the plaintiffs "name, portrait, or picture." 184 Others provide
greater protection. For example, Indiana provides protection for the
use of "name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, distinctive
appearance, gestures, or mannerisms." 185 A federal right-of-publicity

180.
See supra text accompanying notes 132-35; see also Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp.
723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("[T]his right of publicity is usually asserted only if the plaintiff has
'achieved in some degree a celebrated status."'); Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 564 (Utah 1988)
("[T]he complaint fails because it must allege that the plaintiffs' names or likenesses have some
'intrinsic value' . . . . The plaintiffs do not allege . . . that they enjoy any particular fame or

notoriety.").
See supra notes 16-17.
181.
182.
Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 415 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
the fact the plaintiff did not use his birth name for over ten years did not constitute
"abandonment" of the right of publicity in the identity of that name).
183.
See supra text accompanying notes 117-21.
184.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (West 2012).
185.
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-1 (West 2012).
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statute should provide protection for a person's "persona." Several
courts have adopted the term persona to encompass the elements that
identify a person, finding it clear that "the traditional phrase 'name
and likeness' was inadequate to describe the many aspects of a person
which can identify him or her." 186 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged
the importance of protecting the plaintiffs persona rather than a list
of identifiers when it observed:
It is not important how the defendant has appropriated the plaintiff's identity, but
whether the defendant has done so. [Prior cases] teach the impossibility of treating the
right of publicity as guarding only against a laundry list of specific means of
appropriating identity. A rule which says that the right of publicity can be infringed
only through the use of nine different methods of appropriating identity merely
challenges the clever advertising strategist to come up with the tenth. 187

In order to create a workable federal statute, Congress should
define the use of a plaintiffs "persona" as "a use from which the
88
plaintiff is identifiable in the total context of the defendant's use."

This begs the question: How should courts define "identifiable"? In
Professor McCarthy's treatise on the right of publicity, he proposes a
test for liability based on whether "a 'significant' or more than de
minimis number of persons can reasonably identify the plaintiff from
the total context of defendant's use."1 8 9 McCarthy explains that,
unlike trademark law, there need not be a particular number or
percentage of people who actually identify the plaintiff from the
defendant's use. 190 Rather, the number or percentage of people who
can reasonably identify the plaintiff "goes to the extent of the remedy."
McCarthy suggests two types of "identification" the law could
adopt for cases of right-of-publicity infringement.1 91 He refers to the
two types as "aided identification," when persons are able to identify
the plaintiff from the defendant's work while simultaneously viewing
the plaintiff, and "unaided identification," when "a reasonably typical

&

See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 177 at 289-90; see also Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts,
186.
Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 289 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) ("The right of publicity ...
protects against the unauthorized appropriation of an individual's very persona which would
result in unearned commercial gain to another." (emphasis added)); Norred v. Labren Enters.
Mgmt., No. 04-2690, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36566, at *6 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 2005) (explaining
that the right of publicity "protect[s] . . .persona, which does not fall within the subject matter of
copyright"); Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 260 (Sup. Ct. 1984)
("[The New York statute] is intended to protect the essence of the person, his or her identity or
persona from being unwillingly or unknowingly misappropriated for the profit of another.").
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992).
187.
See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 177, at 291 (describing the identification issue in the
188.
right of publicity).
Id. at 146-47.
189.
190.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 143.
191.
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person [can] identify the plaintiff merely from seeing defendant's use
alone." 1 92 But Congress should not adopt McCarthy's test wholesale.

.

McCarthy proposes that "[w]hen plaintiff is a 'noncelebrity'. .
the test of identifiability be that of 'aided identification."'1 93 This
suggestion is problematic due to its circular logic. This proposal would
require courts to determine the threshold question of whether the
plaintiff is a "noncelebrity." The first test for identifiability should be
unaided identification, and if the reasonable person cannot identify
the plaintiff, then the plaintiff can offer an aided identification.
Whether the plaintiff is identifiable based on either of the tests should
determine liability, but the need for aided identification versus
unaided identification should go to the scope of the remedy.
In adopting McCarthy's identification tests, it is important to
note "who" must be able to identify the plaintiff in the defendant's
work. This Note suggests the person who must be able to identify the
plaintiff is the reasonable person familiar with the market in which
the defendant allegedly uses the plaintiffs persona. 194 Adding the
qualifier that the reasonable person must be "familiar with the
market in which the defendant allegedly uses the plaintiffs persona"
will help to control for the wide array of celebrity. The most famous
professional wrestler may not be identifiable to a generic "reasonable
person," but in the professional wrestling market a reasonable person
would readily identify that individual.
There are a myriad of methods for proving a significant level of
identifiability from a specific use. Some of McCarthy's suggestions
include: (1) a simple comparison made in the courtroom between the
defendant's use and the plaintiffs identifying features; (2) evidence of
unsolicited comments to the plaintiff about the similarity; (3) survey
evidence that consumers of defendant's product are able to identify the
plaintiff from the defendant's use; and (4) "direct or circumstantial
evidence of defendant's intent to trade upon the identity of plaintiff,
from which identifiability can be presumed."195 Survey evidence, for
instance, is already in use in right-of-publicity cases to determine
whether a plaintiff was identifiable in a defendant's video game.19 6
The Pesinacourt, discussed in Part II.A, relied on a survey as proof of
a lack of identification where the survey revealed only 6 percent of 306
users of the Mortal Kombat video game were able to identify the

192.
193.

§§

Id.
Id. at 150.

194.
4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
23:91-23:103 (4th ed. 2012).

195.
196.

1 MCCARTHY, supra note 177, at 147-49.
See Pesina v. Midway Mfg. Co., 948 F. Supp. 40, 42 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
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plaintiff as the model for the character in the game.1 97 Courts
commonly rely upon surveys of this type in trademark cases,1 98 and
should provide a practical standard for evaluating identification.
In sum, a federal right-of-publicity statute should effectively
protect an individual's persona. An individual's persona encompasses
any aspect of the individual from which the individual can be
identified in the entire context of the defendant's use. To determine if
a plaintiff is identifiable from a specific use, the reasonable person
familiar with the plaintiffs market must be able to identify the
plaintiff either aided or unaided. Whether the identification was
aided or unaided will go to the scope of the remedy, but the defendant
will be liable if the reasonable person can identify the plaintiff even
when aided.
3. Should There Be a Postmortem Federal Right of Publicity?
States do not agree on whether there is a postmortem right of
publicity. 9 9 The heart of the disagreement lies in whether the state
recognizes the right of publicity as a property right, which is generally
considered to be descendible (able to be inherited by a descendant), or
a personal right, which is not descendible. 200 Rather than getting
tangled in the semantics of whether the right of publicity is a property
right or a personal right, this Note suggests that a federal right of
publicity should be descendible based on the rationale for recognizing
the right of publicity.
A comparison with copyright law is informative of the rationale
for declaring publicity rights descendible. The 1976 Copyright Act
provides protection for the life of the author plus seventy years after
the author's death. 20 1 The basic rationale for providing copyright
protection is that authors need a certain amount of remuneration in
order to invest their time and efforts in creative pursuits rather than

197.
Id.
See generally Zatarains,Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 795 (5th
198.
Cir. 1983) ("The authorities are in agreement that survey evidence is the most direct and
persuasive way of establishing secondary meaning.").
Compare OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1448 (West 2012) (providing protection for up to
199.
one hundred years after the death of the individual), with UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-3-2 (West 2012)
(providing no protection after the death of the individual).
Compare TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1103, 1104 (West 2012) (describing the right of
200.
publicity as a property right in use of name, photograph or likeness assignable to one's heirs for a
period of ten years after death), with NEW YORK CIVIL RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 2011)
(describing the right of publicity as a personal right of privacy that does not survive the death of
an individual).
201.
17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006).
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other activities that may be more financially rewarding. 202 The
rationale for providing the right of publicity is similar to that of
copyright law, in that it rewards performance and thereby encourages
effort and creativity. This rationale would be obfuscated if it did not
extend postmortem to heirs of a celebrity. Justice Hill of the Georgia
Supreme Court states:
If the right of publicity dies with the celebrity, the economic value of the right of
publicity during life would be diminished because the celebrity's untimely death would
seriously impair, if not destroy, the value of the right of continued commercial use.
Conversely, those who would profit from the fame of a celebrity after his or her death for
their own benefit and without authorization have failed to establish their claim that
they should be the beneficiaries of the celebrity's death. Finally, the trend since the
early common law has been to recognize survivability, notwithstanding the legal
20 3
problems which may thereby arise.

If a postmortem right of publicity does not exist, celebrities
may be deprived of income during their lifetime because they will not
receive the benefit of some projects if advertisers choose to simply wait
for the death of the celebrity and use their likeness without
remuneration.
Moreover, a failure to recognize a postmortem right of publicity
would lead to a windfall for advertisers and others who wish to profit
from an individual's persona "in the form of freedom to use with
impunity the [persona] of, the deceased celebrity who may have
worked his or her entire life to attain celebrity status." 204 Therefore,
Congress should recognize a postmortem federal right of publicity.
4. How Long Should Federal Right-of-Publicity Protection Last?
Even among states that agree that the right of publicity is
descendible, there is no agreement by states on how long the
postmortem right-of-publicity protection should last. 2 05 This Note
argues that right of publicity should mirror the protection offered by
the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA). 206
When introducing the CTEA to Congress, Senator Orrin Hatch
explained the main justifications for extending the term of copyright,
including: (1) the insufficiency of the current term to provide a fair
202.
See LOREN & MILLER, supra note 63, at 342.
203.
Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc.,
296 S.E.2d 697, 705 (Ga. 1982).
204.
Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1355 (D.N.J. 1981) (quoting Lugosi
v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 846 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting)).
205.
Compare OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1448 (West 2012) (providing protection for up to
one hundred years after the death of the individual), with KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (West
2012) (protecting name and likeness of a person for fifty years after the person's death).
206.
See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998).
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return for the authors and their heirs, and (2) the failure of the US
copyright term to keep pace with rapid developments in
communications media. 207 These justifications apply with equal force
to the right of publicity.
First, consideration of demographic trends reveals increasing
longevity and a trend toward rearing children later in life. 20 8 These
trends motivated Congress to extend copyright protection from fifty
years to seventy years after an author's death. The right of publicity
should exist for the number of years commensurate with the average
Thus, the right of publicity, like copyright
human lifespan.
protections, should last for at least seventy years.
Second,
unprecedented growth in technology, such as the explosion of social
media, the increasingly realistic graphics of video games, and the
ever-expanding pervasiveness of the Internet, have all led to drastic
increases in the misappropriation of individuals' personas.
Accordingly, the postmortem right of publicity should last for a term of
seventy years in order to adequately incentivize individuals to create
and invest in their personas.
B. A Student-Athlete Escrow Fund
Because student athletes cannot receive compensation and
retain their amateur status, 209 the NCAA must consider other avenues
For
to compensate these athletes for the use of their personas.
establish
to
NCAA
the
instance, one possible alternative would be for
an escrow fund for student athletes from which they can collect
royalties upon completion of their eligibility or graduation. 21 0 There is
already precedent for such action among retired football players. 2 11
In a 2007 class-action lawsuit brought by retired NFL players
against the NFL Players Association (NFLPA), retired players alleged
that the NFLPA's licensing agreements with companies like EA
required exclusive dealing with the NFLPA, which unfairly interfered
with the retired players' licensing opportunities. 2 12 The jury awarded

Senator Orrin Hatch's Introduction of the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1997,
207.
105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm.), auailableat
http://www.copyrightextension.com/page04.html.
Id.
208.
See NCAA, supra note 3, at 12.1.2.
209.
210.
See Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint 1 30, Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc.,
No. C 09-01967 CW, 2010 WL 908883 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2010).
See Adderley v. NFL Players Ass'n, No. C 07-00943 WHA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
211.
115741, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2009).
Parrish v. NFL Players Ass'n, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2007), motion
212.
grantedsub nom. Adderley, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115741, at *8.
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the class $28.1 million for breach of fiduciary duty. 213 The award
consisted of $7.1 million in compensatory damages and $21 million in
punitive damages. 214 The court certified the class as "[a]ll retired NFL
players who executed a group licensing authorization form (GLA) with
the NFLPA" between February of 2003 and February of 2007.215 The
GLA form stated that "the moneys generated by such licensing or
retired player group rights will be divided between the player and an
escrow account for all eligible NFLPA members." 216
A general committee of the NCAA could administer the escrow
fund. 217 The NCAA is involved in all of the licensing of universities
and their student athletes. Accordingly, the NCAA would be in the
best position to manage the escrow fund. It is unclear whether such a
fund would violate Title IX, which makes it illegal for universities to
discriminate based on sex. 2 18 The escrow fund would likely draw Title
IX challenges if the money were collected solely from video-game
companies because there are no video games featuring women's
collegiate athletics.
But the NCAA can avoid this challenge by
collecting funds from other uses of female student-athlete likenesses,
such as artwork. 2 19
In addition to the discrepancies between male and female
athletes, there would be concerns among the different divisions of
college athletics. The NCAA divides athletics at different universities
into divisions 1, 11, and 111.220 The divisional problems should pose a
smaller hurdle than the potential Title IX challenges.
For the
purposes of athletics, the NCAA already treats the different divisions
disparately. 221 For example, Division I schools can give eighty-five

213.
Adderley, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115741, at *4.
214.
Id. at *4-5. "Defendants appealed and the case
$26,250,000." Id. at *5.
215.
Id. at *4.
216.
Id.
217.

settled before decision for

See Membership, NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS ASS'N,

http://ncaa.org/wps/wcm/

connect/public/ncaalabout+the+ncaalmembership+new (last visited Sept. 15, 2012).
218.
Patsy Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
219.
See, e.g., Robert A. Tino, Tennessee Lady Vols Print!Pat Summitt "In-TENN-Sity,"
ORANGE MOUNTAIN DESIGNS, http://www.shop.orangemountaindesign.com/product.sc?product
Id=205&categoryld=8 (last visited Sept. 12, 2012).
220.

See NCAA,

supra note 3; NCAA ACADEMIC AND MEMBERSHIP AFFAIRS STAFF,

2011-12 NCAA DIVISION II MANUAL (2011) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL II], available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D212.pdf,
NCAA
ACADEMIC
AND
MEMBERSHIP AFFAIRS STAFF, 2011-12 NCAA DIVISION III MANUAL (2011) [hereinafter NCAA
MANUAL III], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D312.pdf.
221.
Compare NCAA, supra note 3, at § 15.5.6.1 (permitting eighty-five athletics-based
scholarships for football), with NCAA MANUAL II, supra note 221, at § 15.5.2.1.1 (permitting up
to thirty-six athletics-based scholarships for football).
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football scholarships, 2 22 Division II schools can only give thirty-six, 22 3
and Division III schools do not give any athletic scholarships. 2 2 4
Therefore, the discrepancies between the three divisions of college
athletics would not likely pose a major obstacle to the creation of an
escrow fund by the NCAA because disparate treatment already exists.
Had a fund like this existed when Samuel Keller or Ryan Hart
were in college they would not have had to turn to the court system to
address the misappropriation of their likenesses. Using the $7.1
million compensatory damages figure awarded to retired NFL players
as a rough proxy, Keller and Hart would have received approximately
$708-$2,832 each after four years in school from the use of their
likenesses in the EA college football game alone. 2 2 5 While this fund
would represent a drastic change in the landscape of college athletics,
drastic changes have been made in other areas of college athletics in
the last year, 226 and it is time that these changes account for the
reality facing today's student athletes.
IV. CONCLUSION

Celebrity has become an integral part of our culture. In 2011,
the total US box-office gross was over $10 billion, with over five
studios making more than a billion dollars. 227 Likewise, college
athletics has also become a billion-dollar industry. 228 Unfortunately,
the law fails to protect college athletes the same way it protects other

See NCAA MANUAL I, supra note 3, at § 15.5.6.1.
222.
See NCAA1VIANUAL II, supra note 221, at § 15.5.2.1.1.
223.
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224.
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225.
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10,030 players equals $708 for each player. The NFLPA case involved retired players who had
signed the GLA form from 2003-2007. Accordingly, the compensatory damages will have
spanned a four-year period, but this number would take into account the fact that some players
only suffered damages for one, two, or three years. Therefore, the number in the solution
represents a smaller number than college players would likely receive because the amount they
would receive would be based on the number of years they appear in the game. If $708 is the
baseline for one year, the potential amount a player could make might be as high as $2,832.
Dick Vitale, Realignment Changes Landscape, ESPN (Aug. 27, 2012, 2:29 PM),
226.
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celebrities. Since the right of publicity was first recognized in 1953, it
has evolved differently across the states. States like California, where
the majority of television and film celebrities live, have developed a
more robust right-of-publicity law. But student athletes reside in
every state. They face the same forms of infringement on their rights
of publicity but are treated inequitably based on their states of
residence. Indeed, the current state-law system is inadequate and
fails to represent the interests of student athletes. Therefore, student
athletes need a federal system and an escrow fund to provide
consistent, equitable protection.
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